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Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimality of package bundling by focusing on
the ￿main and accessory￿relationship between two goods. In particular, we
consider option package bundling in which an optional good is valuable only if
it is consumed together with a certain (nonoptional) base good. We develop a
model of option package bundling for a monopolist in which buyers￿valuations
are independently and uniformly distributed. We also allow inter-relationship
between valuations by assuming that the reservation value of the bundle can
be greater or less than the sum of the innate value of both goods. Our analysis
observes that mixed bundling, in which the base good is sold with or without
the optional good, yields a higher pro￿t than pure bundling if and only if
the range of the optional good valuation exceeds a threshold value. We then
conduct a welfare analysis of the bundling choice. The result is surprising:
pure bundling is always desirable from the social welfare viewpoint when a
monopolist chooses mixed bundling.
Keywords: Multiproduct monopoly; Bundling; Optional goods; Interdepen-
dent valuations.
JEL classi￿cation: D42, L11.
￿Acknowledgement to be added.
ySchool of Economics, Nagoya University, 1 Furo, Chikusa, Nagoya 464-8601, Japan. E-mail:
adachi.t@soec.nagoya-u.ac.jp
zSchool of Management, Tokyo University of Science, 500 Shimokiyoku, Kuki City, Saitama
346-8512, Japan. E-mail: ebina@ms.kuki.tus.ac.jp
xSchool of Economics, Nagoya University, 1 Furo, Chikusa, Nagoya 464-8601, Japan. E-mail:
hanazono@soec.nagoya-u.ac.jp1 Introduction
Bundled sales are not as unusual as one may think. While ￿explicit￿bundling is
sometimes denounced as being per se illegal in the U.S.,1 many bundling strategies
are often ￿implicit￿and abound in daily life. Examples include cable TV subscrip-
tion packages, text editors or web browsers in a computer operating system, and
basic and optional plans for cell phone services. Outside the sales of traditional
goods and services, basic and improvement patents are often sold as a bundle.
The characterizing feature of these implicit bundled sales is that the relationship
between the bundled goods is not symmetric: casual observations suggest that many
bundled goods o⁄ered in the real world display ￿main and accessory￿relationship.
More speci￿cally, in these cases, an optional good is bundled, which is valuable only
if it is consumed together with a certain (nonoptional) base good. Surprisingly,
however, this characteristic of bundling has been overlooked both by economists
and antitrust authorities. While the asymmetric relationship plays a signi￿cant role
in the sale of bundled goods, we know relatively little about this type of option
package bundling.
Option package bundling involves complex decision-making for the pro￿t maxi-
mizing ￿rm: sellers must ￿rst decide whether to sell the two goods only in a bundle
(pure bundling) or separately (mixed bundling) and then decide the pricing scheme
for the chosen method of selling. While a typical example of pure bundling is that
of ￿free￿software provided with a computer operating system, mixed bundling is
prevalent in many other cases, such as the cable TV subscription. In the case of
pure bundling not a few consumers may have thought, ￿Many electronic gadgets
have optional features and software that are of little use. Why don￿ t sellers o⁄er the
main good without optional features at a lower price?￿
In this paper, we focus on the role of option package bundling as a method
of sorting consumers with di⁄erent willingness to pay, to address the following two
related questions: (1) Why do we observe two di⁄erent patterns (pure and mixed) in
option package bundling? (What makes pure or mixed bundling an optimal strategy
1for a ￿rm?), and (2) Are the above complaints justi￿able in light of improving
consumer welfare? (On average, does the availability of the purchase of the base
good alone (mixed bundling) bene￿t the consumers?)
One distinct feature of this study is that we also obtained analytical results for
the monopolist￿ s problem. Our main result is the derivation of the optimal bundling
prices for the basic model and to verify the following claim: mixed bundling gives the
monopolist higher pro￿t than pure bundling does if and only if the range of optional
good valuation exceeds a threshold value. This answers Question (1) mentioned
above. Our result suggests an interesting testable implication: the smaller the
diversity of valuation of an optional good, the more likely that the monopolist
adopts pure bundling.
We then conduct a welfare analysis of the bundling choice, and the result is sur-
prising: pure bundling is always desirable from the social welfare viewpoint when a
monopolist chooses mixed bundling. Thus, our answer to Question (2), mentioned
above, is No. The reason for this result is that under mixed bundling the mo-
nopolist can exercise its monopoly in a less restrictive way, resulting in ine¢ cient,
discriminatory pricing.
In this paper, we consider a model beyond a standard setting in which the
reservation value of a bundle is equal to the sum of the innate value of each good
(i.e., independent valuations). A consumer may value the optional good more as he
or she values the base good more. This applies to the case of basic and improve-
ment patents. In other cases, the optional good may have a diminishing value as
a consumer￿ s reservation value of the main good becomes higher. Note here that
while our model entails ￿structural complementarity,￿in the sense that an optional
good is never consumed solely, the reservation value of the bundle can be greater
(￿complementary￿ ) or less (￿substitute￿ ) than the sum of the innate value of both
goods. It can be predicted that the higher the degree of complementarity, the more
likely that mixed bundling is as an optimal strategy. Intuitively, a consumer is,
ceteris paribus, more willing to purchase both goods (precisely because they are
complements) even with pure bundling. We verify this claim analytically as well as
2numerically in a tractable yet formal model.
The situation we consider is described as follows. A monopolist produces base
and optional goods, with constant marginal costs (zero for simplicity; see Section
6). Each consumer demands up to one unit of each good. In this two-goods setup,
the sum of the two prices can be interpreted as the bundling price: generally, pure
bundling corresponds to a zero optional good price, while mixed bundling corre-
sponds to a positive optional good price. In general, we can view our model as
a variant of vertical product di⁄erentiation because all consumers share the same
ranking with regard to consumption patterns (no good, base good alone, and bundle,
evaluated from the lowest to the highest). However, owing to the multidimension-
ality of the valuations, which considerably a⁄ects consumer screening, the demand
for each good depends on both prices of base and optional goods. For example, an
increase in the optional good price not only reduces its own demand but also that
of the base good. This is because consumers who only slightly prefer a bundle to no
good will stop buying any good following the price change.
To discuss the mechanism underlying option package bundling, we provide sev-
eral graphical arguments and insights, following the custom in the literature since
Adams and Yellen (1976). Our analysis observes that monopolistic screening is im-
portant to change the prices of the base and optional goods by keeping the sum (i.e.,
the bundle price) constant. For a marginal increase in the optional good price, this
form of screening has the following three e⁄ects: (a) newcomer gain from consumers
who start buying the base good alone because of the reduced price of the base good,
(b) reduced price loss from consumers who continue to buy the base good alone, and
(c) switching consumers loss from switching from buying a bundle to the base good
alone. Note that those consumers who continue to buy the bundle pay the same
bundle price and therefore have no e⁄ect on pro￿t. Importantly, these e⁄ects are
endogenous with both prices: we verify that while the newcomer gain increases in
both prices, the reduced price loss and the switching loss decrease in the base good
price but increase in the optional good price.
To understand the result that mixed bundling outperforms pure bundling if
3and only if the range of optional good valuation exceeds a certain threshold, it is
instructive to observe how strongly the monopolist is motivated to screen consumers
from pure bundling. Recall that the larger the range of optional good valuation, the
higher the average willingness to pay for a bundle; this necessitates a higher bundle
price for pro￿t maximization. In pure bundling, the bundle price equals the price of
the base good. Therefore, as the pure bundle price increases, the newcomer gains
from screening increases while the switching loss decreases (the reduced price loss
is zero with pure bundling). Thus, the monopolist￿ s motivation to screen consumers
becomes stronger, and pure bundling eventually becomes suboptimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 presents the model with interdependent valuations. We then
derive the optimal bundle prices for the basic model in Section 4. In Section 5, we
provide a welfare analysis. Section 6 discusses our assumption that the (constant)
marginal costs are zero for both goods. Lastly, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on bundling under a monopoly, initiated by
Stigler (1963) and Adams and Yellen (1976), with two-goods, discrete-type consumer
cases.2,3 Our basic model di⁄ers from these previous bundling models in that we
focus on the asymmetric nature of the goods by considering one of the goods as an
optional good.4
McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) provided the primary results that if
consumers￿valuations are independently distributed, then mixed bundling always
dominates component sales. McAfee, McMillan and Winston (1987) do not compare
mixed bundling with pure bundling, because they rule out pure bundling, stating
that it is dominated by mixed bundling. Their argument presumes that the (con-
stant) marginal costs of two goods are positive (more precisely, higher than the lower
bounds of valuation support).5
In contrast, by noting that pure bundling is often observed in reality, Pierce and
4Winter (1996) construct a simple model where pure bundling is chosen as an optimal
strategy. Although they do not explicitly mention it, Pierce and Winter (1996)
assume what our paper calls base and optional goods.6 This feature enables Pierce
and Winter (1996) to directly compare mixed bundling with pure bundling. They
focus on the role of consumer heterogeneity for determining the relative pro￿tability
of pure bundling. In particular, they illustrate that pure bundling is chosen if and
only if consumer heterogeneity in the valuation of an optional good is lower than
some threshold value and vice versa in case of mixed bundling.
To illustrate this result, Pierce and Winter (1996) rely on the speci￿c example
of a setup with two goods and two types of consumers. Indeed, they adopt the
assumption that one good is optional, as in our analysis, primarily because assuming
that both goods are regular is not necessary to screen consumers in mixed bundling,
and also because the exposition becomes simpler. They conclude that pure bundling
is optimal when one type of consumer￿ s valuation for the optional good is similar to
the other￿ s, as long as a monopolist serves both types (no exclusion).
The present paper generalizes Pierce and Winter￿ s (1996) results by analyzing
a model with (a uniformly distributed) continuous valuation, as in McAfee, McMil-
lan and Whinston (1989).7 Although Pierce and Winter￿ s (1996) model is similar
to our approach in many respects, there are several important di⁄erences: ￿rst,
our result holds without the quali￿cation of exclusion; second, their discrete-type
setup typically involves the correlation of valuations between types, whereas our
continuous-type model adopts the independence of valuations; and ￿nally, their
analysis comprises a one-dimensional screening between two types, whereas our
analysis comprises a multidimensional screening with deterministic mechanisms.
The present paper￿ s model also considers interdependent valuations. Venkatesh
and Kamakura (2003) set up a monopolistic model where a consumer￿ s reservation
value is not merely the sum of the component prices when considering complements
(superadditive) or substitutes (subadditive). Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) com-
pare pure bundling with mixed bundling by considering complementarity and sub-
stitutability, an uncovered topic in papers such as McAfee, McMillan and Whinston
5(1989). Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) focus on two parameters: one is the mea-
sure of interdependency, and the other is the ratio of the constant marginal cost
to the common upper bound of the valuation for each good. They argue that pure
bundling should be employed if two goods are strong complements. An important
di⁄erence between this work and our model is that the two goods are asymmetric
in our model. Moreover, while Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) rely on a numerical
analysis of the relative pro￿tability of mixed bundling compared to pure bundling,
we provide distinct results for the optimal bundling strategy of a monopolistic seller.8
3 Model
3.1 Setup
We consider a multi-product monopolist￿ s pro￿t maximization problem. Following
convention in the literature, we use the same setup as in McAfee, McMillan and
Whinston (1989) to model the problem, with one important departure: there is a
base good and an optional good in the following sense, while a base good has its
own value irrespective of the consumption of other goods, an associated optional
good can only have value if it is consumed together with the base good.
More speci￿cally, suppose that a monopolist produces two types of goods, good
1 (base) and good 2 (optional). Each consumer consumes up to one unit of each
good. Let (v1;v2) denote a vector of valuations of goods 1 and 2 for a consumer.
Note that v2 should be interpreted as the conditional utility that is realized only if
good 1 is consumed together with good 2.
Consumers are heterogenous in the sense that (v1;v2) is distributed uniformly
on [0;1]￿[0;￿], where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, with independence between v1 and v2 (the density
is thus 1=￿). Two remarks are in order. First, the reason for employing a uniform
distribution is that it enables us to derive an explicit solution and to provide an
intuitive explanation. Second, it appears natural that the highest valuation of the
optional good is no greater than that of the base good.9 The parameter ￿ is thus a
measure of the diversity of consumers￿valuations of the optional good.
6A consumer with (v1;v2) then obtains utility of v1 if good 1 alone is consumed,
and vB ￿ v1 + v2 + ￿v1v2 if both goods are consumed together,10 where we call ￿
the degree of contingency (following Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003)). We assume
that ￿ is common for all consumers. If ￿ > 0, then the higher v1, the higher an
incremental value of v2 for vB. In this case, the relationship between a base good
and an optional is complementary. If ￿ < 0, an optional good has a negative impact
on the value of the base good. This case applies, for example, to subscription of
the print edition of a magazine and its online version. In the case, an optional
good is an (imperfect) substitute to a base good. Lastly, if ￿ = 0, the base and the
optional goods are independent.11 To ensure that 1 + ￿v1 > 0 and 1 + ￿v2 > 0 for
all (v1;v2) 2 [0;1] ￿ [0;￿], we assume that ￿ > ￿1 and 1 + ￿￿ > 0.
Now, let pB be the price that the monopolist charges for a unit of the ￿composite
good￿and p1 be the price of good 1. For expositional convenience, we de￿ne ￿price￿
for good 2 as p2 ￿ pB ￿ p1. The costs of producing each good are constant and
normalized to zero. It is thus clear that in this setting, welfare maximization requires
everyone in [0;1]￿[0;￿] consumes both goods 1 and 2. These assumptions concerning
distribution support and the zero marginal costs are relaxed in Section 5.
A consumer prefers a bundle to the base good only, if and only if










Similarly, a consumer prefers a bundle to nothing if and only if
vB ￿ pB ￿ 0
, v2 ￿





Given good 2 has a non-negative value for any consumer, p2 = 0 implies that a
consumer buys both goods or nothing. Also, if p1 = 1 and p2 > 0, a generic
consumer buys either both or nothing (because ￿ > ￿1 and v1 ￿ 1). We identify
these pricing strategies as pure bundling (see Figure 1). On the other hand, if p2 > 0
7and p1 < 1, some consumers buy only good 1 and others bundle goods 1 and 2. We
refer to this pricing strategy as mixed bundling. In this sense, pure bundling is
nested in mixed bundling. A consumer whose (v1;v2) does not satisfy either of the
inequalities buys nothing.
[Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3.]
Given the prices and nature of the goods, the demand for the goods is depicted
in Figures 2 (complementarity: ￿ > 0) and 3 (substitutability: ￿ < 0).12 The shapes
of the two curves are determined by the following derivatives:
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2￿[1 + ￿(p1 + p2)]
(1 + ￿v1)3 ? 0 if and only if ￿ ? 0.
In particular, the curve of vB1
2 (v1) is convex, with the slope being negative in
the case of ￿ > 0, and positive in the case of ￿ < 0. For the shape of vB0
2 , note that




￿(1 + ￿(p1 + p2)) < ￿1 if ￿ > 0
0 > ￿(1 + ￿(p1 + p2)) > ￿1 if ￿ < 0.
The curve of vB0
2 (v1) is convex if ￿ > 0, and concave if ￿ < 0. Finally, it is veri￿ed
that the two curves intersect at (p1;p2=(1 + ￿p1)).
Intuitively, the shape for v1 < p1 is derived from the fact that as v1 and v2 move
closer, a consumer obtains more utility from a bundle in the case of ￿ > 0, and vice
versa in the case of ￿ < 0. The shape for v1 ￿ p1 is explained as follows: for a ￿xed
value of v2, as v1 increases, a bundle becomes more (resp. less) attractive if ￿ > 0
(resp. ￿ < 0).
83.2 Modeling Interdependent Valuations
Notice the di⁄erence between Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) and our formulation,
apart from their setting of two normal goods. As Eckalbar (2010) suggests, in general,
utility with non-independence is expressed by
vB ￿ v1 + v2 + H
where H > 0 indicates complementarity, and H < 0 indicates substitutability.
Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) set H = ￿(v1 +v2), so that the consumption value
of consuming both goods is modeled as
vB ￿ (1 + ￿)(v1 + v2),
where ￿ is a parameter of the degree of contingency/ As per Venkatesh and Ka-
makura (2003), the goods are complements if ￿ > 0 and substitutes if ￿ < 0.
In their formulation, complementarity/substitutability is incorporated addi-
tively, which provides linear boundaries between consumers with di⁄erent purchase
patterns. They primarily rely on numerical analyses and presume a formulation
that signi￿cantly eases the computational burden. In contrast, our formulation al-
lows multiplicability: H = ￿v1v2. The two approaches di⁄er in the manner that they
treat complementarity/substitutability. In particular, the cross-partial derivative of




= ￿ (i;j = 1;2, i 6= j),
while it is zero in Venkatesh and Kamakura￿ s (2003) formulation. Note that our
model encompasses super- and sub-modularity in valuation, while Venkatesh and
Kamakura￿ s (2003) does not.
4 Pure vs. Mixed Bundling
We now analyze an optimal pricing strategy for the monopolist. Let p1 2 [0;1]
and p2 2 [0;￿] be the prices of goods 1 and 2 in the regime of mixed bundling,
9respectively. As discussed, p1 = 1 or p2 = 0 is interpreted as pure bundling. Let b
denote the bundling price in the regime of pure bundling (that is, b is de￿ned as pB
with p2 = 0). And, let b￿, p￿
1 and p￿
2 denote the optimal prices.
To obtain the heuristics for an optimal solution with complementarity and sub-
stitutability between valuations for the two goods, consider the following screening
in the case of independence (￿ = 0). For a given price (p1;p2), let the optional good
price increase by a small amount, " > 0, and the base good price decrease by the
same amount ", keeping the price of the composite good constant (see Figure 4 for
the case of p2 > 0). Notice that the inframarginal consumers purchasing both goods
have no e⁄ects on the pro￿ts.
[Insert Figure 4.]
Three ￿rst-order e⁄ects are then identi￿ed. First, there are new consumers who
start buying the base good alone (￿Newcomer Gain￿ ). This e⁄ect is evaluated by
"p1p2=￿ (the selling price, p1, multiplied by the density, "p2=￿, in the ￿rst-order
change). Second, those who continue to buy a base good alone pay less (￿Reduced
Price Loss￿ ). This is evaluated by ￿"(1￿p1)p2=￿ (the loss in the price per customer,
￿", multiplied by the density, (1 ￿ p1)p2=￿). Lastly, there are consumers who
switch from buying a bundle to a base good alone (￿Switching Loss￿ ). This is also
evaluated by ￿"p2(1￿p1)=￿ (the loss in the revenue per customer, ￿(pB￿p1) = ￿p2,
multiplied by the density, (1 ￿ p1)"=￿, ignoring the second-order change). Hence,
the gain exceeds the losses if and only if:
p1p2 ￿ 2(1 ￿ p1)p2 () p1 ￿ 2=3 and p2 > 0; or p2 = 0.
This shows that as long as p2 > 0, this screening (starting from p1 = 1) should
be continued until p1 = 2=3 in order to increase the pro￿ts for the given bundle price.
We then need to check what to do for p2 = 0: In this case, the e⁄ects include only
the newcomer gain and the switching loss, and these are merely the second-order
change (see Figure 5).
10[Insert Figure 5.]
The newcomer gain from this change is evaluated by "2p1=(2￿) (ignoring any
higher order changes), whereas the switching loss is by (1￿p1)"2=￿. Hence the gain
is greater if and only if p1=2 ￿ 1 ￿ p1 , p1 ￿ 2=3. Therefore, the optional good
price p2 = 0 should be increased if the base good price is greater than 2=3.
Combining the previous arguments, we can ￿nd the optimal prices by (i) solving
the optimal pure bundling price, and if it is less than 2=3, which de￿nes the optimal
prices, otherwise (ii) setting p1 = 2=3 and ￿nding p2 > 0 that maximizes pro￿t.14
Adachi, Ebina and Hanazono (2010) show that pure bundling is suboptimal for
￿ > 2=3 because the optimal pure bundling price is greater than 2=3. An intuitive
explanation is as follows. It is straightforward to discern that the newcomer gain is
increasing in both prices, and the reduced rate and switching losses are decreasing
in p1 but increasing in p2. For a small p2, the gain from screening is thus more likely
to exceed the losses if p1 is higher. When ￿ is large, the bundle price b = p1 + p2
is likely to be high because the average willingness to pay for the bundle is large.
In this case, the monopolist ￿nds it pro￿table to invite consumers who are willing
to buy a base good at a high price for the cost of the switching consumers and the
reduced rate, both of which only slightly a⁄ect pro￿ts for a small p2.15
4.1 Analytical Results
We now characterize the optimal bundling strategy of the monopolist in the presence
of complementarity or substitutability between the two goods (￿ 6= 0). In this
subsection, we observe that even in the presence of interdependent valuations, the
above argument of screening applies. In addition, the optimal scheme is such that
the monopolist adopts mixed bundling if and only if ￿ exceeds a threshold value.
We ￿rst obtain the following proposition about the optimal mixed bundle prices.
Proposition 1. If mixed bundling is optimal, then the optimal price of the base
good p￿
1 is independent of ￿ 2 (0;1] and the optimal price of the optional good p￿
2.
11Proof. See Appendix A1.







(ln(1 + ￿) ￿ ln(1 + ￿p1))
￿
.
As Appendix A1 shows, p￿
1 is de￿ned by F(p￿
1;￿) = 0. The next proposition pro-
vides another characterization of p￿
1 with respect to the degree of contingency, ￿.
Namely, complementarity makes the optimal price of the base good lower under
mixed bundling.
Proposition 2. The optimal price of the base good under mixed bundling, p￿
1(￿), is
decreasing in ￿.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
It is also shown that p￿




















































1(1) = exp(￿0:5) ￿ = 0:607 > 1=2. We now characterize the optimal
bundling strategy. Let b￿ denote the optimal price under pure bundling (it is not
necessarily optimal if the scheme of mixed bundling is optimal).
Proposition 3. If the optimal pure bundle price b￿ is greater than p￿
1(￿), then mixed
bundling is optimal.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
12Propositions 1 and 3 imply that the optimal price pair for mixed bundling and
pure bundling (i.e., bundling with p2 = 0) lies on the bold lines in Figure 6. To
better understand this, ￿rst note that b￿ > p￿
1 cannot constitute an optimal strategy
(Proposition 3). Second, the price pair with p￿
2 = ￿ cannot be optimal because the
monopolist only sells the base good. The optimal strategy, in this case, is to set the
price of the base good to one half (the pro￿t is ￿=4). Last, the price pair (p1;p2)
with p1 6= p￿
1(￿) and p2 2 (0;￿) cannot be an optimal strategy under mixed bundling
(Proposition 1).
[Insert Figure 6.]
Thus, we can avoid considering the optima globally, because we know that the
optimal pricing strategy is either ￿p2 = 0 and p1 < p￿
1(￿)￿(in this case b is used
for p1), or ￿p2 > 0 and p1 = p￿
1(￿).￿Hence, we thus focus on the prices on the bold
lines in Figure 6: we treat the optimization problem as a one dimensional problem
for each region to check the global second-order condition, along with the ￿rst-order
condition.
Proposition 4. If the optimal pure bundle price b￿ is no greater than p￿
1(￿), then
pure bundling is optimal.
Proof. See Appendix A4.
Now, let b￿ = b￿(￿;￿). We also illustrate the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The optimal pure bundle price b￿(￿;￿) is increasing in ￿.
Proof. See Appendix A5.
To complete our argument, we need to show that b￿(￿;￿) exceeds p￿
1(￿) for ￿ >
e ￿ 2 (0;1). It is clear that for any ￿ > ￿1, b￿ # 1=2 < p￿
1(￿) as ￿ # 0. Figure 7
shows that as ￿ increases, the marginal gain from increase in the pure bundle price
b = p￿
1(￿) (area B) increases, while the marginal cost (area C multiplied by C)
13remains the same. Thus, for a large ￿, the marginal gain exceeds the marginal cost,
and hence, b￿ is larger than p￿
1(￿). Note here that b￿ may not be able to exceed
p￿
1(￿) if ￿ ￿ 1. Although we have assumed ￿ ￿ 1, our argument does not crucially
depend on this assumption.16 If we do not assume ￿ ￿ 1, we expect the threshold to
exist for any ￿ > ￿1. Summarizing the argument so far, we establish the following
claim.
[Insert Figure 7.]
Claim 1. From the seller￿ s viewpoint, mixed bundling outperforms pure bundling if
and only if the range of optional good valuation exceeds a certain threshold. If the
degree of contingency ￿ is su¢ ciently negative, then pure bundling may always be
optimal, depending on the range of other parameters.
4.2 Numerical Examples
We now provide some numerical examples. Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate how the
optimal prices change as ￿ increases (from 0.3 to 1, with increments of 0.05) de-
pending on the nature of both goods. For this purpose, we set ￿ = ￿0:1 (Figure 8)
or ￿0:3 (Figure 9) for substitutes, ￿ = 0 for independency, and ￿ = 0:1 (Figure 8)
or 0:3 (Figure 9) for complements). In all cases, mixed bundling is more desirable
for the monopolist as ￿ increases. It is also observed that the greater the value of
￿, the lower the threshold of ￿.17 That is, if the goods are complements, then the
seller is willing to provide mixed bundling for a smaller value of ￿ and vice versa (as
seen in Proposition 2). Intuitively, when the goods are complements, the monopo-
list loses less from mixed bundling (some consumers purchase the base good only)
because many consumers are willing to purchase both goods, precisely because of
complementarity.
[Insert Figures 8 and 9.]
14Considering real world examples, it can be believed that Claim 1 captures the
causes of option package bundling well. ￿Free￿software is considered an example,
where ￿ would be presumably low (at least relative to the valuation from that of
the software itself). On the other hand, special cable TV channels would have a
high value for interested viewers. Claim 1 suggests that this explains why cable TV
subscription packages are often o⁄ered as options.
5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we investigate whether allowing mixed bundling enhances social
welfare, maintaining the assumption that the monopolist charges pro￿t-maximizing
prices. From the analysis in the previous section, we know when the monopolist
chooses mixed bundling and pure bundling. Remember that pure bundling is a
special case of mixed bundling. Thus, when the monopolist chooses pure bundling,
prohibiting mixed bundling by antitrust authorities has no e⁄ect on the monopolist￿ s
decision-making process.
As mixed bundling is a means of price discrimination, it should primarily cause
e¢ ciency distortions, as in standard monopoly pricing. Thus, when the monopolist
chooses mixed bundling, does the prohibition of mixed bundling improve welfare?
For ￿ = 0, we can derive an analytical result, as will be subsequently illustrated.
However, it is not possible to use the same argument for ￿ 6= 0, and thus we conduct
a numerical analysis.
5.1 The Case of Independency (￿ = 0)
By prohibiting mixed bundling, there are welfare gains and losses (see Figure 10).
The gains come from (i) consumers who switch from buying no good to a bundle,
as the bundle price is reduced, and (ii) those who switch from good 1 alone to a
bundle. The losses are from the consumers who switch from buying good 1 alone
to no good. The gains from (ii) are closely related to the e¢ ciency distortion in
the standard monopoly (or vertical di⁄erentiation) model, as these consumers are
15screened through the price of an optional good p2. However, there are some changes
that a⁄ect welfare that are absent in the standard monopoly model, namely the
changes in p1 (reduced) and in b (increased). As pure bundling is optimal for ￿ ￿ 2=3,
this restriction on mixed bundling has bite only when ￿ > 2=3. We now obtain the
following result.
[Insert Figure 10.]
Proposition 6. When the monopolist chooses mixed bundling, pure bundling is
desirable from the social welfare viewpoint.
Proof. Using the optimal prices derived in Propositions 1 and 2 in Adachi, Ebina










2(￿) = ￿=2 + 1=3,
i.e., the price for good 1 in mixed bundling, p￿
1(￿), is smaller than the optimal pure




Now consider the welfare gains from the consumers who switch from buying no
good to a bundle (part (i) above), whose level is denoted by A, and the welfare
losses, denoted by B.
We maintain that A is greater than B for any ￿, so that the total welfare gains (A
plus the standard gains) must be larger through the prohibition of mixed bundling.
Although calculating the exact welfare gains for A involves the integration of the
consumers￿willingness to pay, we only require a lower bound to support the claim.
The consumers associated with this gain are in the parallelogram, surrounded
by the lines drawn by v1 = 0, v1 = 2=3, v1 +v2 = b￿(￿) and v1 +v2 = p￿
1(￿)+p￿
2(￿).













































Recall that each consumer in this parallelogram lies in the northeast of b￿(￿)
line and thus its willingness to pay for a bundle is at least as much as b￿(￿). The
welfare gains A are therefore greater than b￿(￿) times the area. Now we compute
an upper bound of B, the welfare losses. The consumers associated with this loss
are in the triangle surrounded by the horizontal axis, the lines drawn by v1 = 2=3,







































which is exactly the same as the parallelogram above. Each consumer in this region
will switch to buying nothing when mixed bundling is prohibited. Here, each con-
sumer￿ s willingness to pay for good 1 alone is at most b￿(￿) such that the welfare
losses B are smaller than b￿(￿) times this area. We now compute the upper bound


















Hence, the welfare gains from prohibiting mixed bundling, which must be strictly
larger than A, are greater than the total losses B.
As ￿ increases, does the welfare loss become larger or smaller? The above
proposition does not answer this question. Based on the explicit forms for social
welfare (available upon request), we verify that the welfare loss becomes larger as ￿
increases, as depicted in Figure 11.
[Insert Figure 11.]
The result that pure bundling is socially desirable for ￿ > 2=3 is worth mention-
ing because it would at ￿rst appear counter-intuitive. To understand this, remember
17that our model is a monopolistic model, and hence mixed bundling is used only for
ine¢ cient, discriminatory pricing. Consider instead the case where ￿rms compete in
the market for the optional good, while a base good is monopolistically provided. If
the monopolistic base good producer is forced to adopt mixed bundling, then some
consumers are able to choose from which ￿rm they buy an optional good. On the
contrary, if the monopolistic base good producer commits to pure bundling, then
the ￿rm can exclude other optional good producers from the market, and hence ac-
quire stronger market power. Overall, competition a⁄ects the consequences of pure
bundling, and thus the above result on social welfare should be taken with caution.
5.2 Numerical Analysis when ￿ 6= 0
In the case of ￿ 6= 0, we cannot apply the previous argument. Thus, we conduct a
numerical analysis. In Appendix A6, four tables are shown in the region of ￿, where
the monopolist optimally chooses mixed bundling. Figure 12 is a representative case
(￿ = 0:3). It is observed that social welfare under pure bundling is higher than that
under mixed bundling in these four cases. We conjecture that Proposition 6 holds
in the presence of contingent valuations.
[Insert Figure 12.]
6 Discussion
In this paper, we assume zero marginal costs for both goods. In the case of in-
dependent valuations (￿ = 0), Adachi, Ebina and Hanazono (2010) examine the
robustness of the results to parametric changes in marginal costs and distribution
supports. In particular, they consider the cases with positive marginal costs or with
the lowest valuation of a good that exceeds the marginal cost (an upward shift in the
valuation support). They then illustrate that the main result (that mixed bundling
outperforms pure bundling if and only if the range of optional good valuation ex-
ceeds a certain threshold) holds, except when the (constant) marginal cost of an
18optional good is higher than its lowest valuation. In this case, mixed bundling is
always optimal if the optional goods are priced at least as high as the marginal cost.
That is, it is always bene￿cial to avoid serving ine¢ cient consumers (i.e., those who
have less valuation than the marginal cost).
To better understand this, consider a pure bundling with p1 > 0 and p2 = 0. Let
c2 > 0 be the (constant) marginal cost of an optional good. Then, it becomes clear
that this price is dominated by p0
1 = p1 ￿ c2, p0
2 = c2: with this change, the monop-
olist avoids serving ine¢ cient consumers with optional goods without incurring any
loss, and attracts new consumers of the base good with v1 2 [p0
1;p1], thereby earning
positive pro￿ts. Note that this argument does not depend on the assumption of
uniform distribution; therefore, the conclusion is robust for any continuous distrib-
ution. This case may be applied to a real-world example of luxurious leather seats
for cars, which are costly to produce and which some consumers may not appreciate
enough to justify their cost. In fact, we would rarely observe pure bundles in the
case of such luxurious optional goods. We conjecture that this argument holds in
the presence of complementarity or substitutability.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a model of a monopolist￿ s two-goods option package bundling
problem with the assumption of a uniform distribution of consumers￿valuations. We
then study the monopolist￿ s problem of choosing pure or mixed bundling in the con-
text of base and optional goods by considering complementarity and substitutability.
This paper is a generalization of Pierce and Winter (1996) in the sense that we con-
sider continuous valuation. We ￿nd that pure bundling can generate more pro￿ts
than mixed bundling if and only if the diversity of a consumer￿ s valuation for the
optional good is small. As for welfare implications, our analysis shows that pure
bundling is always desirable from the social welfare viewpoint, with a caution that
competition in the market of optional goods may alter the result.
Because of its speci￿c assumptions, our model is certainly special. In particular,
19it raises the question that if there are many optional goods, as in reality, can we
distinguish between bundled features and options for buying by merely looking at the
main goods and each feature individually? Although we may be able to generate
interesting testable implications by considering such a many-optional-goods case,
it would certainly involve di¢ cult problems because of the presence of more than
two goods in bundling problems. A more tractable way to ask the question is to
determine, ￿rst, whether it is more pro￿table to bundle all optional goods as a
package or to sell each of them separately, and second, whether options bundled
with a base good are more pro￿table. For this direction of research, the framework
of Armstrong (1999), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), Fang and Norman (2006),
Chu, Leslie and Sorensen (2011), and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2011), who analyze
speci￿c multi-good cases, would be helpful.
Appendices
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
For any optimal prices (p￿
1;p￿
2) under mixed bundling, consider a small reduction in
p1 by ", keeping p￿















































It is clear that the above equality is independent of ￿ and p2 as in the case of ￿ = 0.18










and F(0;￿) < 0 < F(1;￿), p￿
1(￿) is uniquely determined as a function that satis￿es
F(p￿
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1 + (3 ￿ ￿)p1 ￿ 2
￿
.
By the mean-value theorem, it is veri￿ed that
ln(1 + ￿) ￿ ln(1 + ￿p1) =
1
1 + ￿p1 + "￿
(￿(1 ￿ p1))














1 + ￿p1(￿) + "￿
= 0,
which is equivalent to
(2￿p
2
1 + (3 ￿ ￿)p1 ￿ 2) + ("￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p1))p1 = 0.
21Because ("￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p1))p1 < 0 (resp. > 0) if ￿ > 0 (resp. < 0), we must have
2￿p2
1 + (3 ￿ ￿)p1 ￿ 2
￿
> 0,
and thus F￿ > 0, which leads to p0
1(￿) < 0.
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
Consider how screening works for p2 = 0. Note that in this case there are no
￿rst-order changes and thus we need to focus on second-order changes.
Next, consider a small reduction in p1 by " (with the associated change in p2
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fln(1 + ￿) ￿ ln(1 + ￿p1)g:
Note that the ￿rst term has third-order changes of " and is thus ignored. The gain
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￿￿" + (1 + ￿p1)(ln(1 + ￿p1) ￿ ln(1 + ￿(p1 ￿ ")))
(ln(1 + ￿p1) ￿ ln(1 + ￿(p1 ￿ ")))"
= lim
"!0
￿￿ + (1 + ￿p1) ￿
(1+￿(p1￿"))
(ln(1 + ￿p1) ￿ ln(1 + ￿(p1 ￿ "))) + ￿
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(by l￿ Hospital￿ s rule)
= lim
"!0






(by l￿ Hospital￿ s rule, again)
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which is the desired condition. This implies that for any b￿ > p￿
1(￿), the marginal
gain from mixed bundling exceeds the marginal cost.
A4. Proof of Proposition 4
It su¢ ces to show that b￿ < p￿
1(￿) implies that no mixed bundling price (p￿
1(￿);p2)
is more pro￿table than b￿(￿;￿).
23Step 1: Characterization of the optimal pure bundle price20
Suppose b < p￿
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=￿ for b ￿ ￿.
For b ￿ ￿, it is equal to
￿
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for b ￿ ￿.
Next, for b ￿ ￿, the pro￿t under pure bundling is
￿
PB










































































for b ￿ ￿. Notice that ￿PB(b) is continuous at b = ￿ because
￿
PB
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+ 2ln(1 + ￿b)
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< 0 for b ￿ ￿,
where the sign of (￿PB)00 is determined because ln(1+￿￿) is positive (resp. negative)
if and only if ￿ > 0 (resp. ￿ < 0). Note also that (￿PB)0(b) is continuous at b = ￿.
Thus, as long as (￿PB)0(0) > 0 and (￿PB)0(p￿
1(￿)) < 0 (remember that we assume
that b￿ < p￿
1(￿)), the optimal pure bundle price b￿(￿;￿) is uniquely determined by

























Step 2: Pro￿t changes by an increase in p2 at (p￿
1(￿);p2)































































































multiplied by 1=￿. In the following, we ignore the term 1=￿ for notational simplicity
(because it does not a⁄ect the result).
The marginal gain is given by
A+B =






















































so that the marginal pro￿t is
￿￿p￿



























































































> 0 for p2 > 0,
which implies that @MP=@p2 is monotonically increasing. Because MPjp2=0 < 0,
the graph of MP is drawn as in Figure 14.
[Insert Figure 14.]
27Thus, there are no points that locally maximize the pro￿t for p2 2 (0;￿ +p￿
1(1+




1(1 + ￿￿)). However, the pro￿t at either endpoint is lower than with the optimal
pure bundle price b￿ because (i) it is already seen that p2 = 0 is suboptimal, and
(ii) the pro￿t at (p1;p2) = (p￿
1;￿ +p￿
1(1+￿￿)) is lower than with (p1;p2) = (1=2;￿ +
(1=2)(1+￿￿)). Notice that, by charging (1=2;￿+(1=2)(1+￿￿)), the monopolist sells
the base good only, at the component-wise monopoly price. However, by Proposition
3, this price is dominated by a mixed bundle price. Thus, the optimality of pure
bundling is established.
Case B: p￿
1(￿) < ￿. As long as p2 ￿ ￿ ￿ p￿
1(￿) (now, (0;vB0
2 (0;￿)) is below
























Thus, the marginal gain is given by















































Clearly, the marginal gain is decreasing in p2 while the marginal loss is increasing in
p2, meaning that the marginal pro￿t falls as p2 increases (with p1 = p￿
1 held ￿xed:
the argument holds either for ￿ > 0 or for ￿ < 0). When p2 is su¢ ciently large
that p￿
1(￿)+p2 > ￿, it is veri￿ed there are no local interior maxima on (p￿
1(￿);p2) as
in Case A, and that the boundary points are not optimal. Thus, the optimality of
pure bundling is also established in this case because, as in Case A, the net marginal
gain at (p￿
1;0) coincides with (￿PB)0(b￿) in the case of b￿ < ￿ (i.e., 1+b￿=￿￿ ￿(1+
2￿b￿)ln(1 + ￿b￿)=￿2￿).
28A5. Proof of Proposition 5






(1 + ￿￿)ln(1 + ￿￿) ￿ ￿￿
(ln(1 + ￿￿))2 .
By the mean-value theorem, we have
(1 + x)ln(1 + x) ￿ x
= (1 + x)ln(1 + x) ￿ (1 + 0)ln(1 + 0) ￿ x
= x ￿ fln(1 + e x) + 1g ￿ x
= xln(1 + e x) > 0
for 1 + x > 0 and e x is some value between 0 and x (which is either positive or
negative). This shows that @b￿(￿;￿)=@￿ > 0.






















Either for ￿ > 0 or for ￿ < 0, ￿=(@G=@b) is positive.
A6. Numerical Values in Welfare Comparison (￿ 6= 0)
[Insert Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4.]
29Notes
1A well-known example is the legal case of Microsoft￿ s attempt to bundle its Windows operating
system and its Internet browser (Internet Explorer) (see e.g., Evans, Nichols, and Schmalensee
(2005) and Rubinfeld (2009)). In the EU countries, bundling can be illegal once it is judged to be
a predatory strategy under Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
2Schmalensee (1984), McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), and Salinger (1995) then study
two-goods, continuum-type cases (Salinger￿ s (1995) work also permits discrete types). Many-goods,
continuum-type cases are analyzed by, e.g., Armstrong (1999), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), Fang
and Norman (2006), Crawford and Cullen (2007), and Crawford (2008). An important common
idea in this body of work is that bundling reduces the dispersion of the buyers￿average willingness
to pay for the goods, unless the buyer￿ s valuations for bundled goods are perfectly positively
correlated. In this situation, a monopolist can extract more pro￿ts through bundling. Excellent
surveys on bundling include Varian (1989, Subsection 2.6), Shy (1996, Chapter 14), Motta (2004,
Chapter 7), Shy (2008, Chapter 4), and Belle￿ amme and Peitz (2010, Chapter 11).
3We con￿ne our attention to the case of a monopoly. See, e.g., Nalebu⁄ (2004), Thanassoulis
(2007), Armstrong and Vickers (2010), and Jeon and Menicucci (2011) for analyses of bundling
and strategic interaction. Cheng and Nahm (2007) consider a similar problem where there is a
main good and an optional good, and each good is produced by a di⁄erent producer. In a di⁄erent
vein, Ellison (2005) considers price competition in a Hotelling model with base and optional goods,
and studies the consequence of ￿add-on pricing,￿in which the price of the optional good is hidden
upon the purchase of the base good. He observes that, under certain conditions, add-on pricing
reduces ￿rms￿competition.
4Similar to this paper, Adachi and Ebina (2011) study a model of package discount for add-
ons, by adopting the main-accessory relationship between two goods as in our model. They ￿nd
that discounting for a package relative to the (exogenous) market price is pro￿table if the relative
number of price-sensitive consumers is large. Our analysis is di⁄erent from theirs in several ways.
First, we assume no outside suppliers that determine the market price for a package, and thus we
have no implication for discounts. Second, they assume only two types of consumers heterogeneity
(high- and low-valued consumers). More importantly, Adachi and Ebina (2011) assume a speci￿c
demand structure that abstracts the tradeo⁄ between a bundle and no purchase. Speci￿cally,
they assume myopic consumers who decide whether to buy a base good at the base good price,
without considering potential purchase of an option. This feature misses the relationship between
the optional good price and the demand for base goods, which is key in our multidimensional
screening analysis.
5Eckalbar (2010) obtains closed-form solutions for mixed bundling with independent valuations.
In an older version of this paper (Adachi, Ebina and Hanazono (2010)), independent of Eckalbar
(2010), we analyze the problem of bundling with the independency of base and optional goods.
Both Eckalbar (2010) and Adachi, Ebina and Hanazono (2010) allow for the support of valuation
of one good to be di⁄erent from the other (which Eckalbar (2010) calls ￿asymmetric cases￿ ).
6This assumption ￿ts the data used by Pierce and Winter (1996) (advertisement on newspapers
with large circulation as a base good, and those with small circulation as an optional good).
7In the context of option package bundling, pure bundling is a special case of mixed bundling,
and thus, the two regimes can be considered as one ￿connected￿regime. This enables us to consider
30mixed bundling or pure bundling only, without worrying about separate sales. In addition, the
nature of the option signi￿cantly reduces complexity associated with the analysis of mixed bundling.
8Most studies explore a demand-based explanation on bundling decisions. Salinger (1995) and
Evans and Salinger (2008) analyze cost savings from bundling. In particular, Evans and Salinger
(2008) assume cost reduction by joint production: the constant marginal cost of joint production
is no greater than the sum of the constant marginal cost of separate production (cB ￿ c1 + c2).
As in Adachi and Ebina (2011), Evans and Salinger (2008) do not start with utility. Evans and
Salinger (2008) study welfare analysis in terms of cost minimization.
9The restriction on ￿ ￿ 1 should not be important: in the case of ￿ = 0, the main results in
Adachi, Ebina and Hanazono (2010) hold as long as ￿ ￿ 3=2 (because the optimal pure bundling
price does not exceed the upper bound for v1).
10An alternative setting would be to assume a one-dimensional index support [0;1] for the mass
of consumers, and valuation mappings v1 : [0;1] ! R+ and vB : [0;1] ! R+. However, this setting
would be better suited to analyzing issues surrounding quality upgrading. Although they share
similar features, our focus is on discriminatory pricing behavior rather than on quality upgrading.
11In the present paper, we do not focus on the case of ￿ = 0 because we have extensively analyzed
this situation in an older version (Adachi, Ebina and Hanazono (2010)).
12Both ￿gures are depicted for the case of p1 +p2 < ￿. If p1 +p2 ￿ ￿, the curve v2 = vB0
2 (v1;￿)
intersects the boundary v2 = ￿ at v1 = (p1 + p2 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿￿).
13Note that if ￿ < 0 and p1 + p2 = ￿1=￿, even a consumer with (v1;v2) = (1;￿) has negative
utility by purchasing a bundle, given as






(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿￿) < 0 ( * ￿ < 0).
14For an analytical veri￿cation of this claim, see Adachi, Ebina and Hanazono (2010).
15Note that ￿ increases the variance of the willingness to pay for a bundle along with its mean.
We later consider variance-preserving upward shifts of the support for the valuation of good 2, and
verify that the main thrust of this argument holds.
16The only concern is that the term ln(1 + ￿￿), which appears several times in Appendices,
might not be well-de￿ned because 1 + ￿￿ can be negative if ￿ > 1. However, the term ln(1 + ￿￿)
appears from the restriction ￿ ￿ 1, and thus the results hold even if we allow ￿ > 1.
17In Figure 8, the thresholds for ￿ are 0:55 ￿ 0:60 for ￿ = 0:1 and 0:67 ￿ 0:70 for ￿ = ￿0:1. In
Figure 9, the thresholds are 0:45 ￿ 0:50 for ￿ = 0:3 and 0:75 ￿ 0:80 for ￿ = ￿0:3 (in both cases,
the threshold with ￿ = 0 is 0:67).

















= 1 ￿ p￿
1
by l￿ H￿pital￿ s rule.
19Note that ￿" > 0 (resp. < 0)for ￿ > 0 (resp. > 0).
3120Note that the case with b ￿ 1 is excluded because by Proposition 3, mixed bundling is optimal
in such a case.
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Table 1: Complementarity (￿ = 0:1)








Table 2: Substitutability (￿ = ￿0:1)












Table 3: Complementarity (￿ = 0:3)






Table 4: Substitutability (￿ = ￿0:3)
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